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In an adversarial system the prosecutor serves a dual function: he is supposed
to be at once an advocate and a neutral minister of justice. Our judicial system has
long placed before the prosecutor, in the words of the United States Supreme
Court, the "twofold aim ... that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."' To
the first end, he is required to "prosecute with earnestness and vigor," and because
of the second the Court cautions that "he may strike hard blows, [but] he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones."2 It may be difficult, of course, for a prosecutor to draw
the line between hard blows and foul ones, and so over time the legal profession
has developed rules governing a prosecutor's pre-trial obligation to avoid a
wrongful conviction.
In recent years, the legal profession in the United States has begun to extend
those rules into the post-conviction setting and to delineate the contours of a
prosecutor's ethical obligation to remedy a wrongful--or a possibly wrongful-
conviction. The American Bar Association first adopted a model rule for post-
conviction conduct in 2008.3 Wisconsin became the first (and only) state to adopt
the rule in 2009; New York adopted a similar rule in 2006, but no other state has
yet done so.4 In the absence of such guidance, prosecutors' offices across the
country have taken widely divergent approaches to post-conviction claims of
innocence.
This essay will address the changing nature of the prosecutor's ethical
obligations after conviction. Our focus will be upon the prosecutor's ethical
obligation to support reopening a conviction based upon newly available evidence.
We will examine three alternative models for deciding whether a conviction should
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Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
2 Id.
3 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Changes to Model Rules Impact Prosecutors, CRIM. JUST., Spring
2008, at 1.
4 Order, In the Matter of Amendment of Supreme Court Rules Chapter 20, Rules of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, No. 08-24 (Wis. 2009), available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/runlhear/DisplayDocument.html?content-html&seqNo=36849; see also
Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the
Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56 n. 91 (2009).
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be reopened and suggest the best model relieves the prosecutor of all responsibility
for that decision and therefore of the need to play a problematic dual role. We also
suggest a framework by which a prosecutor who is required to be both advocate
and arbiter should approach post-conviction decisions.
I. THE PROBLEM OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION
We turn first to the nature of the problem. In the United States, interest in the
prosecutor's ethical obligation after conviction has been spurred recently by the
large number of exonerations based upon DNA evidence-252 so far in the United
States alone. 5 But this phenomenon is not unique to the United States; there have
been at least eight DNA-based exonerations in Canada 6 and two in the United
Kingdom.7 The most recent exoneration in the United Kingdom led the Criminal
Cases Review Commission, a neutral body that determines which convictions
should be reconsidered in the light of new evidence, to ask the Crown Prosecution
Service in March of 2009 to undertake a general review of cases in which testable
forensic evidence is available.8 Australia, too, is struggling with how best to
address post-conviction claims based upon DNA evidence. The Australian Law
Reform Commission has recommended that Australia require the long-term
retention of forensic material and establish a process to consider applications for
post-conviction review;9 the government referred those recommendations to two
advisory panels in 2005 but thus far has taken no concrete action. I0 The DNA
database recently established in Israel will surely give rise to similar demands to
reopen some convictions for which biological evidence has been preserved." In
South Africa, where the Parliament is considering a law that will greatly expand its
5 The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
6 Barry Scheck, Closing Remarks, 23 CARDOzO L. REv. 899, 900 (2002) (noting eight DNA
exonerations in Canada as of 2002).
7 Andy McFarlane, DNA Doubt Cast over Other Murders, BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/7946777.stm.
8 Id.
9 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 96, ESSENTIALLY YOURS: THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION, ch. 45, recommendation 45-1 (2003), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/atrc/publications/reports/96/.
10 Arr'y GEN. DEP'T, FULL AUSTRALIAN Gov'T RESPONSE, Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/title/airc96/agd.htm; see also Lynne Weathered, Does Australia
Need a Specific Institution to Correct Wrongful Convictions?, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY
179, 188-89 (2007).
1 Shahar Ilan, The Case for the DNA Database, HAARETZ, July 13, 2008, available at
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/997014.html.
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DNA database, proponents note that the database can protect the innocent as well
as detect the guilty.'
2
DNA-based exonerations may have peaked in the United States because DNA
testing is now routinely done before trial. Exonerations likely will continue, albeit
at a lesser rate, as the technology of testing continues to improve. Indeed, about
twenty-five percent of the first 211 exonerees were convicted after the advent of
DNA testing13 and in almost forty percent of those cases, DNA testing technology
had advanced since the trial.'
4
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The recent spate of exonerations has prompted new attention to how the
criminal justice system should respond to post-conviction claims of actual
innocence, whether based upon DNA evidence or upon other newly available
information. We will focus upon DNA because it can establish innocence so
conclusively that it places in sharp relief the issues prosecutors face in responding
12 Kanina Foss, The Signatures of Innocence and Guilt, THE STAR, Apr. 28, 2009, at 22
(noting the exonerations due to DNA in the United States). In the United States, newly tested DNA
evidence matched a profile in the DNA database in 49 of the first 200 exonerations. Brandon L.
Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLuM. L. REv. 55, 118-19 (2008).
13 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1656 (2008) (finding 55
of the first 211 exonerees "were convicted even though DNA testing was available at the time of their
trials").
14 Id. at 1658.
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to post-conviction claims of innocence. Reforms in countries with adversarial
systems have followed three primary models: (1) casting the post-conviction
prosecutor as a neutral minister of justice; (2) expanding post-conviction
adversarial proceedings; and (3) departing significantly from the adversarial
model. The prosecutor plays some role in each of these models, but we will focus
more attention upon the first, in which the primary locus of post-conviction
decision-making is the prosecutor's office. We do so in order to highlight the
problems inherent in casting the prosecutor as a neutral minister of justice.
We will suggest that, because of the tension inherent in asking the prosecutor
to be both a zealous advocate and a neutral minister of justice, the other models
provide more appropriate ways of evaluating claims of innocence.
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE OR
INVESTIGATE NEW EVIDENCE
We turn first to the prosecutor's obligation to investigate new evidence after
conviction. Examining the analogous duty to disclose evidence before conviction,
we contend that institutional incentives and cognitive biases make it difficult for a
prosecutor to fulfill that obligation and that it likely becomes more difficult
following conviction. We then examine factors a prosecutor might consider when
determining whether he is obligated to disclose or investigate new evidence after
conviction.
A. The Pre-Conviction Analogue
Before conviction a prosecutor must, in the words of one American legal
scholar, forgo "conduct that would increase the likelihood of obtaining a
conviction in favor of conduct that will increase the likelihood of obtaining
justice."' 15 One of the most prominent ways in which the prosecutor must
subordinate advocacy to justice is in fulfilling his duty to disclose information to
the defense. In the United States, ethical rules require the prosecutor to make
timely disclosure of all information "known to the prosecutor" that "tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense."' 16 This ethical obligation
is in part also a legal one; as a matter of constitutional due process, the prosecutor
must disclose all exculpatory information that is also material, meaning there is a
reasonable probability the result will be different if the evidence is disclosed.'
7
15 Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the
Prosecutor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41
Hous. L. REv. 1337, 1346 (2004).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009).
17 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) ("[E]vidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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The due process obligation covers information held by the police as well-even if
it is unknown to the prosecutor.
18
In recognition of the pressure prosecutors face because of their dual
responsibilities, 19 states increasingly have adopted less restrictive discovery
regimes under which criminal defendants are legally entitled to more expansive
discovery than Brady v. Maryland requires. 20  That, however, is a less than
complete solution to the problem. Rules requiring the disclosure of specific types
of information in addition to all "exculpatory" information still place upon the
prosecutor the obligation to determine what is and is not to be turned over.21 Even
a prosecutor subject to open-file discovery rules may be authorized to withhold
some information as privileged-for example, to prevent witness intimidation-
although the prosecutor's privilege analysis is subject to court approval in some
states.22  Finally, even a prosecutor with an open-file policy may-through
18 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); see also Seth F. Kreimer & David
Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U.
PA. L. REv. 547, 577-78 (2002).
19 In North Carolina, for example, discovery reform was initiated after a capital murder trial
in which prosecutors did not disclose evidence that the victim had been seen alive after the date on
which the defendant was alleged to have killed him. Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence,
Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File
Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 257, 264, 272 (2008).
20 See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1623 (2005) ("In contrast to federal constitutional and
statutory requirements, more than forty states require that exculpatory evidence be disclosed to
defendants at some point before trial. Nearly half of the states ... require pretrial disclosure of
witness names, addresses, and prior statements .... "). Arizona and Florida allow criminal
defendants to depose government witnesses, and in some cases people who are not scheduled to
appear as witnesses, in preparation for trial. See ARIZ. R. CRiM. P. 15.3; FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(h).
In North Carolina, "the prosecution is responsible for providing the defense, not only with the
material that it has in its file, but also with relevant materials in the files of law enforcement agencies,
which it may never have seen or possessed." Mosteller, supra note 19, at 275.
21 A large number of state statutes list categories of items that the prosecutor is expected to
disclose. See, e.g., ARK. R. CRiM. P. 17.1(a) (six specific categories); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
86a (West 2009) (four specific categories); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23 (West Supp. 2009) (nine
specific categories); see also Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections
Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 541, 586 (noting that "even in jurisdictions that have
endorsed broader discovery," most discovery schemes define mandatory disclosure "in terms of
narrow categories").
22 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 412() (West 2004) ("Matters Not Subject to Disclosure"
include an "informant's identity .. . [if] his identity is a prosecution secret" and evidence the
disclosure of which would "involve[ ] a substantial risk of grave prejudice to national security" so
long as "failure to disclose will not infringe the constitutional rights of the accused"); MINN. R. CRIM.
P. 9.01, subd. 3(2) ("[I]nformation relative to... witnesses.. . shall not be subject to disclosure if the
prosecuting attorney files a written certificate with the trial court that to do so may endanger the
integrity of a continuing investigation or subject such witnesses or persons or others to physical harm
or coercion .... "); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-1912(4) (LexisNexis 2004) ("Whenever the
prosecuting attorney believes that the granting of an order [of discovery] ...will result in the
2010]
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negligence-fail to disclose exculpatory information, or, through the malfeasance
of others, fail to disclose information known only to another state agency, such as
the police.
23
Experience in the United States shows it is difficult for a prosecutor to fulfill
simultaneous roles as a zealous advocate and as a neutral minister of justice. For
example, even in last year's high-profile prosecution of United States Senator Ted
Stevens, the prosecutors repeatedly withheld information from the defense,
including notes indicating one of the Government's key witnesses had no
recollection of an inculpatory conversation he later described on the witness
stand.24 The trial court eventually quashed the conviction and will likely sanction
the prosecutors, a consequence that has prompted the Justice Department to order
all federal prosecutors to undergo additional training regarding their obligation to
disclose exculpatory information to the defense.25 Furthermore, there is evidence
that the problem is systemic: one study of over 11,000 murder convictions from
1963 to 1999 found that convictions were reversed because the prosecutor failed to
disclose material evidence or presented false evidence in more than three percent
of the cases 2 6-and that, obviously, does not account for the cases in which such a
deviation may have gone undetected.
B. The Inherent Conflict
We think it unlikely that prosecutors everywhere are brazenly disregarding
their obligations. Institutional disincentives, however, reduce the probability that
the prosecutor acts as a truly neutral minister of justice-particularly with respect
to post-conviction claims. The institutional focus of a prosecutor's office is upon
possibility of bodily harm to witnesses or that witnesses will be coerced, the court may permit him or
her to make such a showing in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone.").
Most states also allow exceptions for any material considered attorney work product. See, e.g., ME.
R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2002(E)(3) (West 2003).
23 There are many examples of prosecutorial negligence. See, e.g., United States v. Diabate,
90 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2000) (government's failure to turn over exculpatory evidence
after promising open-file discovery was one example in its "dismal history" of "'concerted
indolence"' in handling discovery matters); State v. Schwantes, 314 N.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Minn.
1982) (discussing prosecutor's plausibly "inadvertent" violation of open file discovery by a failure to
disclose report to defense counsel after defense counsel had already copied the file); John G.
Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J.
437, 461 (2001) ("The Brady case law is filled with examples of defendants who received 'open file'
discovery from well-meaning, but negligent prosecutors.").
24 Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2009, at
Al, A14.
25 Charlie Savage, Elite Unit's Problems Pose Test for Attorney General, N.Y. TMES, May 8,
2009, at A20.
26 ANGELA J. DAvis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERIcAN PROSECUTOR 131
(2007).
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closing current cases, not reevaluating old ones, and the time and resources
devoted to the latter task necessarily take away from the former.27 Prosecutors also
may face a political climate that responds favorably to a "tough on crime" message
and thereby discourages the prosecutor from devoting resources to anything but the
pursuit of new convictions. 28 Finally, there may be institutional resistance to the
very idea that the system is far more fallible than we thought. Wrongful
convictions pose a challenge to the integrity of the entire adversarial process,
which values highly just the types of evidence exonerations have called into doubt,
including eyewitness identifications and confessions.29 Prosecutors have a vested
interest in maintaining public confidence that the system produces reliable results.
Indeed, in the United States, exonerations have already served to undermine
support for capital punishment.30
Cognitive bias may also make it difficult for a prosecutor to evaluate fairly
whether a piece of evidence is indeed exculpatory. 31 For example, one should
expect a prosecutor to overvalue evidence that supports the defendant's guilt and
discount evidence that tends to undermine that conclusion. 32 John Grisham's non-
fiction book, The Innocent Man, recounts just such a case. Also, the prosecutor
may be unaware that a possible defense theory could be bolstered in some non-
obvious way by a particular piece of evidence that, though seemingly insignificant
by itself, reveals a pattern or otherwise takes on significance in context-what the
intelligence community calls the "mosaic" problem.
33
27 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims
of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 132-37, 148-50 (2004).
28 See id. at 153-54.
29 In a study of the first 200 DNA-based exonerations, Brandon Garrett found thirty-one of
the exonerees had confessed. Garrett, supra note 12, at 88. In eighteen of those cases the defendant
was either a juvenile, mentally disabled, or both. Id. at 89.
30 For example, in 2000, then-Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium on all
executions in Illinois because of what he called the "shameful record of convicting innocent people
and putting them on death row." Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al; see also Ralph Blumenthal, After Hiatus, States Set Wave of
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2008, at Al (noting decline in public support for capital punishment,
which some advocates attribute in part to exonerations).
31 See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.
L. & LIBERTY 512, 516-18 (2007).
32 Id. at 517-18. This phenomenon is known as selective information processing. Id. at 517.
Other types of cognitive bias contribute to the inability of a prosecutor to evaluate evidence from a
neutral perspective. For example, confirmation bias "leads individuals to seek out and prefer
information that tends to confirm whatever hypothesis they are testing"-i.e., that the defendant is
guilty. Id. at 516-17. Belief perseverance leads an individual to "adhere to [his] beliefs even when
the evidence that initially supported the belief is proven to be incorrect." Id. at 518.
33 See McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Due to the mosaic-like
nature of intelligence gathering, for example, [w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed[ ] may
appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of
information in context.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F.
2010]
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One Israeli defense attorney expressed the difficulty facing the prosecutor
who tries to determine whether to withhold evidence as privileged this way: "It's
like wearing a double hat. First, I have to value the evidence for the prosecution
... and then I have to value the same evidence as if I were the defense attorney."
34
That same tension inheres after conviction, when cognitive bias likely looms even
larger because the prosecutor's belief in the defendant's guilt has been reinforced
by the jury.35
Although these institutional and cognitive problems with casting the
prosecutor as a neutral minister of justice persist, and perhaps even increase, after
conviction, a prosecutor has even greater discretion at that stage. First, as
discussed below, fewer legal rules cabin the prosecutor's discretion after
conviction. Second, there is no consensus and little guidance regarding the extent
of a prosecutor's ethical obligation after conviction, and a robust adversarial
system for deciding factual questions may no longer be available. 36  Often the
prosecutor is, as a practical matter, the sole arbiter of whether a defendant has
access to potentially exculpatory material, including DNA, and the prosecutor's
support or opposition may make or break the defendant's chance at exoneration
through whatever procedure remains available, such as executive clemency.37
In recognition of the plight of a wrongfully convicted defendant, some
commentators have suggested that after conviction the prosecutor abandon
Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[The Government's] theory is that each of these allegations-and
even the individual pieces of evidence supporting these allegations-should not be examined in
isolation. Rather, [it believes] '[t]he probity of any single piece of evidence should be evaluated
based on the evidence as a whole,' to determine whether, when considered 'as a whole,' the evidence
supporting these allegations comes together to create a 'mosaic' that shows the Petitioner to be
justifiably detained."); Prosser, supra note 21, at 569 ("This problem [of determining when
something is exculpatory] is compounded by the fact that prosecutors cannot always know what the
value of evidence might be to the defense. They may have no experience in thinking strategically
from a defense point of view and they may lack knowledge about how the evidence in question could
corroborate the defendant's version of events.").
34 Peter Raven-Hansen, Panel Report, National Security Secrecy in the Courts: A
Comparative Perspective from Israel and Ireland, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHics J. 63, 69
(2006) (statement of Ami Kobo, Deputy Nat'l Defender of Israel).
35 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 31, at 518-20; Medwed, supra note 27, at 138-50.
36 See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 502 (2009) ("After a conviction ... there is
minimal post-conviction process available to which the prosecutor may defer on the question of
whether an injustice was done. The prosecutor, not the judge or jury, is the key fact finder.");
Medwed, supra note 4, at 56 (noting that even Model Rule 3.8 "may remain too vague to operate
effectively in practice"); Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After
Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REv. 171, 173 (2005) ("Prosecutorial discretion is at its height in the
postconviction context because legislators and professional code drafters have not focused on
postconviction issues.").
37 Medwed, supra note 4, at 37.
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altogether his adversarial posture and act entirely as a neutral minister of justice.38
As we have seen, however, discarding the adversarial posture is easier said than
done. In adopting its new Model Rule, the ABA itself recognized that prosecutors
"have institutional disincentives to comport with" post-conviction obligations.
39
When we ask the prosecutor to wear the hat of a neutral minister of justice, we ask
him to play a role that is in considerable tension with his role as a zealous
advocate; it is no wonder if he sometimes fails.
Of course, the difficulty of the task does not absolve the prosecutor of the
obligation to act ethically and, despite the cautionary note we have sounded, the
data indicate we should not be too disheartened about the capacity of prosecutors
to do justice. In his study of the first 200 DNA-based exonerees in the United
States, Brandon Garrett found that "in twenty-two cases (12%) police or
prosecutors or the FBI initiated the DNA testing.' 4° Garrett further found:
Many exonerees faced difficulties obtaining access to DNA testing
absent willing cooperation of law enforcement. In at least seventy-one
out of 200 exonerations (36%), the exoneree applied for a court order to
gain access to DNA testing. In at least twenty-four instances, the
exoneree obtained testing pursuant to a state statute providing for
postconviction DNA testing .... In the largest category, however, 119
exonerees (60%) received access to DNA testing through the consent of
law enforcement or prosecutors. This finding credits law enforcement
for its role in correcting miscarriages of justice. . . . However, in
approximately half of the cases law enforcement did not cooperate, at
least initially, and the exonerees had to secure DNA testing through other
means.
4 1
Although the cooperation of law enforcement or of the prosecutor was the most
frequent means of obtaining post-conviction testing, the adversarial process did
play a useful role: courts granted 60% of the forty judicial petitions of which we
know the disposition.42 Furthermore, it appears the availability of a petition
process may have spurred prosecutorial cooperation after initial resistance; where
38 Green & Yaroshefky, supra note 36, at 506 ("Post-conviction, the prosecutor's role, as a
representative of the executive branch, should be viewed even more clearly as administrative, not
adversarial."); Medwed, supra note 4, at 57-61 (arguing prosecutors should take affirmative action to
investigate potential wrongful convictions by establishing "Prosecutorial Innocence Units").
39 ABA Crim. Just. Section, Report to the House of Delegates 105B (2008).
40 Garrett, supra note 12, at 118.
41 Id. at 119-20 (footnote omitted).
42 Id. at 117, 119 (noting the courts denied testing in sixteen cases and granted testing in
twenty-four cases).
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the disposition of the petition is unknown, the exoneree likely received access to
testing by the consent of the prosecutor.43
Although more than half the prosecutors initially resisted DNA testing, it is
unlikely the prosecutors who immediately consented were the only ones trying to
adhere to their ethical obligations; those who resisted the requests no doubt
thought they, too, were doing the right thing.
C. Factors for Resolving the Issues
We turn now to the factors relevant to a prosecutor in resolving the inherent
conflict that arises with new information that tends-or may tend-to cast doubt
upon the verdict in a closed case. No constitutional rule governs a prosecutor's
obligation with respect to evidence discovered after trial. The Supreme Court
recently ruled that a person convicted in a state court has no right under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to access DNA evidence for
testing.44 In reaching its holding, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's broad view
that a prosecutor's obligations under the Due Process Clause extend to the post-
conviction context.45 Although the prosecutor may be subject to some obligations
under state law, for the most part his conduct following conviction will be guided
only by ethical standards.
Still, the prosecutor's ethical obligation to disclose material, exculpatory
information appears straightforward-indeed, deceptively so. The new ABA Rule
requires a prosecutor to disclose to the court and to the defendant "new, credible
and material evidence" that creates a "reasonable likelihood that a convicted
defendant did not commit [the] offense" and to undertake a further investigation
based upon this type of evidence.46 The problem is that after conviction most
43 See id. at 119-20 ("[L]aw enforcement sometimes consented only after a court ... was
planning to order testing.").
44 Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316
(2009).
41 Id. at 2319-20 ("The Court of Appeals went too far, however, in concluding that the Due
Process Clause requires that certain familiar preconviction trial rights be extended to protect
Osborne's postconviction liberty interest .... Osborne's right to due process is not parallel to a trial
right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair
trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief. Brady is the wrong framework.").
46 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoiuDucT R. 3.8(g) (2009); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 427 n.25 (1976) ("At trial this duty [to disclose material exculpatory evidence] is enforced by
the requirements of due process, but after a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by the ethics of
his office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that casts doubt
upon the correctness of the conviction."). This standard is quite similar, by the way, to the due
process standard that applies before trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
("[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ...."); see also United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) ("[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
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conflicts arise with regard to evidence of unknown value. The prime example is
untested DNA, but one could imagine a situation in which other information-that
does not rise to the level of being "credible and material"-could rise to that level
if only further investigation were undertaken.47 This raises two questions: When
does the prosecutor have a duty to disclose evidence that might be exculpatory so
that the defendant can undertake his own investigation? And when is the
prosecutor obligated to pursue the lead himself?
Although most states now have a procedure for a convicted defendant to
petition a court specifically for DNA testing, the prosecutor's response to that
request still matters greatly. Of course, the prosecutor may consent to the testing
even if the court has denied or surely would deny a petition for testing. The
prosecutor alone may make the decision whether to allow testing if the defendant
is in one of the three states that has no established statutory procedure to obtain
DNA evidence, seeks access to evidence other than DNA in any of the forty-odd
states where the established procedure covers only DNA evidence, or is ineligible
to file a petition under state law.48 Likewise in Australia, only New South Wales
has a formal mechanism by which a convicted defendant can petition an
independent panel for access to DNA evidence; in the other states the defendant is
dependent upon the discretion of the local police or prosecutor.49
We think there are four main factors the prosecutor should consider when
deciding whether he is obligated either to release potentially exculpatory evidence
or to undertake his own investigation of it.50 Using DNA evidence as an example,
those factors are: how probative of guilt or innocence the testing may be; whether
an adversarial process is available to decide the issue; whether the defense counsel
has been diligent; and how costly the DNA testing is.
The most critical consideration is how probative of guilt or innocence the
evidence is likely to be. 5' DNA evidence presents the easiest case; often a test
result that excludes the convicted defendant as the source of the biological sample
would establish with certainty that he did not commit the crime for which he was
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.").
47 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 482 (noting the Model Rule does not
"prescribe how to respond when the credibility of new evidence has yet to be evaluated").
48 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 1679-82 (noting only six states and the District of Columbia
permit non-DNA-related petitions and describing a number of eligibility restrictions states place on
DNA-testing petitions).
49 Weathered, supra note 10, at 188-90.
50 See generally Zacharias, supra note 36, at 209-14, 226-27 (describing many of the same
considerations).
51 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 507 ("The key question, then, is how
convinced the prosecutor must be of the defendant's innocence or how doubtful she must be of the
convicted defendant's guilt to call for her to rectify an apparent injustice through whatever judicial or
executive process is available.").
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convicted. In some cases, however, the new evidence-even DNA evidence-is
not likely to be conclusive. The states have adopted a variety of standards for
determining when the courts should order post-conviction DNA testing. These
standards, which can be grouped into four main categories, 52 suggest the different
standards the prosecutor also might apply to determine whether he is ethically
obligated either to release evidence or to investigate potentially exculpatory
evidence.
The majority of states grant DNA testing if there is a reasonable probability
the defendant would not have been convicted had an exculpatory test result been
presented at trial. The Iowa statute is typical: "The court shall grant the motion if'
certain requirements are met and "DNA analysis of the evidence would raise a
reasonable probability that the defendant would not have been convicted if DNA
profiling had been available at the time of the conviction and had been conducted
prior to the conviction. 53 The widespread adoption of this standard likely reflects
the availability of federal funds to help defray the costs of post-conviction DNA
testing in states that embrace it.
5 4
Only a few states have a lower standard, requiring a defendant to show merely
that it is likely DNA could be probative of innocence. A small number of states
have adopted higher standards, granting a petition to test DNA only if an
exculpatory result would more likely than not have resulted in acquittal at trial,
only if the defendant shows by clear and convincing evidence that an exculpatory
result would exonerate him, or only if "the results of the ... DNA testing, on its
face, would demonstrate the convicted individual's factual innocence. 55 Finally,
three states have no statutory procedure by which a defendant can petition for
DNA testing.56
52 Garrett, supra note 13, at 1676-77, app.
53 IOWA CODE § 81.10(7)(e) (2009).
5 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 413, 118 Stat. 2260, 2285 (2004). See
Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009).
55 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-200(a); Garrett, supra note 13, at 1676-77, app.
56 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2316, reported that four states had no such procedure, but Alabama
has recently passed a statute allowing a defendant convicted of a capital offense to petition for DNA
testing. See 2009 ALA. LAws 768 (approved May 22, 2009).
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Standards for Court to Order DNA Testing
More Demanding
No statutory process for defendant to obtain DNA evidence 3 states
Exculpatory test result would generate clear and convincing
evidence defendant is innocent (2 states) or demonstrate
the convicted individual's factual innocence (1 state) 3 states
More likely t.tha. not pjeti -ner would..no.th.av.ee.n .cvict..ed .2 states."
Reasonable probability of acquittal if an exculpatory
test result had been admitted at trial DC & 38 states
.Likely DNA results would be probative of innocence 4 states
Less Demanding
If the prosecutor believes the untested evidence meets the standard under his
state's procedure, then surely he is ethically obligated to consent to testing. The
question remains, though: If the evidence is not probative enough to meet the
state's standard, should the prosecutor release the evidence anyway? That the
Model Rule does not address this situation suggests there is no consensus. In view
of the asymmetry of the interests involved, the prosecutor may still have an ethical
obligation to authorize the testing in a case that does not quite meet the applicable
standard, depending upon the other factors canvassed below.
A second, related consideration is whether the state provides a neutral
decision-maker to determine whether new testing should be undertaken. Where a
defendant's post-conviction claim seeking access to new evidence can be settled
by a court, and it is a close question how probative the evidence might be, one
might suppose the prosecutor's obligation extends only to ensuring that the defense
has all the relevant information so that each side can vigorously advocate its
position. In many cases, however, an adversarial proceeding is not available.
5 7
Where there is no court to decide the issue, again one might want the prosecutor to
cede close calls to the defendant.
57 See Garrett, supra note 13, at 1679-82.
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Adversarial Proceeding Unavailable:
Limits Upon State Post-Conviction Testing Procedures
Court allows petition if...
[I Technology Not Avail. at
Time of Trial
SLimited to Certain
Crimes
-Identty at Issue at Thal
* Statutory Time Limit
M Defense Counsel Not at
E 5 Fault for Failure to Test
Z 2 Did Not Plead Guilty
Type of Limitations
'Some states impose more than me of these limitations.
Source: Brandon L. Garrett, Climing Innocence. 92 Mim. L. Rev. 1629,1719-23 (2008)
A third consideration is the diligence of the defense counsel. Many states bar
a defendant from petitioning for DNA evidence if his counsel did not request
testing at trial, or allow the petition only if the requested testing was not
58technologically possible at the time of the trial. Because the adversarial process
rests upon zealous advocacy, the public interest in maintaining incentives for trial
counsel to act diligently is obvious. The defendant may bear a heavy cost as a
result, however; the defense attorney failed to request DNA testing at the time of
trial in 24% of the 55 cases of exonerees convicted when DNA testing was
available.59 One therefore might still in some circumstances impose upon the
prosecutor an ethical obligation to release evidence that could have been
discovered before trial for example, if there is no reason to believe trial counsel's
failure to seek testing before trial was a tactical decision rather than an oversight.
Finally, the prosecutor must consider the cost of DNA testing. Currently,
testing costs approximately $1,000.60 The state often pays for the test because the
defendant is indigent, but testing imposes additional costs upon the state regardless
of who pays the $1,000. Those costs include the diversion of resources from open
cases-for which, in most states, there is already a backlog of samples to be
58 Garrett, supra note 13, at 1681-82, app. (twelve states require testing to have been
impossible at time of trial; four do not allow testing if failure to test before trial was due to defense
counsel error).
" Id. at 1658.
60 Brief for Current and Former Prosecutors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10,
Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (No. 08-6).
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tested6 1-and the need to address false negatives generated when a sample has
degraded or a laboratory mishandles and thereby contaminates the sample, a risk
that increases with each re-test.
62
Beyond monetary costs, there is a public interest in finality. Reopening a
conviction may mean reopening an emotionally difficult time for the victim. A re-
investigation might also intrude upon the victim in more concrete ways; she may,
for example, be required to re-submit her own DNA evidence. Insensitivity to
such non-monetary costs may prompt a public backlash against reopening claims.
63
These costs weigh against an ethical standard that requires the prosecutor to act
where the new evidence is less likely to exonerate the defendant.
64
III. PROSECUTOR'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT REOPENING THE CONVICTION
Of course, granting DNA testing-or pursuing another exculpatory lead-is
only a first step. Once a defendant possesses significant new exculpatory
information, a prosecutor must determine whether he is ethically obligated to assist
the defendant in vacating his conviction. The same four factors we just discussed
apply here as well, but particularly important are 1) how probative the collected
evidence is of guilt or innocence, and 2) whether an adversarial process is
available.
A. The Pre-Conviction Analogue
It is useful to compare the post-conviction issue to its pre-conviction
analogue. Before conviction the prosecutor is ethically obligated to perform only a
limited screening function: he can continue to pursue a case so long as he has
probable cause to believe the defendant is guilty. 65 Probable cause does not mean
61 NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., NATIONAL FORENSIC DNA STUDY REPORT 3 (2003),
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/203970.pdf (estimating that in 2003 there were over 500,000
cases for which possible biological evidence was still in the possession of law enforcement or
backlogged at laboratories). Of course, where other forensic testing or investigation is involved, the
monetary costs may be more significant.
62 See Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2327-29
(2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
63 In New South Wales, Australia, for example, an earlier attempt to establish an independent
panel to investigate claims of innocence was suspended after it began a reinvestigation of a
particularly high-profile crime because, according to the state police chief, it operated without
sufficient "checks and balances to protect anyone other than the applicant." Lynne Weathered, A
Question of Innocence: Facilitating DNA-Based Exonerations in Australia, 9 DEAKIN L. REv. 277,
284 (2004).
64 Medwed, supra note 4, at 50-51; Medwed, supra note 27, at 145-46.
65 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009).
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the defendant is more likely than not guilty, 66 So it is a fairly low standard.
Although a prosecutor would not violate the Model Rule by proceeding to trial
based only upon probable cause,67 as a practical matter a prosecutor is more likely
to consider whether the court is likely to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The pre-conviction rule is premised in part upon the belief that the prosecutor
should not over-exclude cases from the fact-finder's consideration because the
adversarial process is the best way to achieve the correct result.
69
B. Potential Standards Governing a Prosecutor's Obligation to Support Vacatur
In the post-conviction setting, the prosecutor continues in practice to serve as
gatekeeper to the extent that his response to a motion to reopen a conviction
signals something about the defendant's claim of innocence. Of course, the
prosecutor cannot vacate the conviction, but he can support the defendant's motion
to vacate or for a new trial. Once the conviction is vacated, the prosecutor regains
the discretion not to pursue the case.7° Where statutes or procedural rules preclude
judicial relief, the prosecutor can support the defendant's petition for executive
clemency.71 His support for clemency, or for a new trial, can make a significant
difference in the outcome.72
The ABA Model Rule obligates the prosecutor to "seek to remedy the
conviction" when he "knows of clear and convincing evidence" the defendant is
innocent. Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky contend that standard is too
demanding; they would require the prosecutor to seek to remedy a conviction if the
evidence establishes only that a defendant is more likely than not innocent,
regardless of the standard under state law for ordering a new trial.73 We think it
impractical, however, in view of the incentives and biases at work, to obligate the
prosecutor as an ethical matter to act upon evidence that does not meet the legal
66 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) ("[Tlhe [probable cause] determination...
does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a
preponderance' standard demands.").
67 See The Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Proposed Prosecutorial Ethics Rules, 61 THE REC. 69, 79-80 (2006) (noting the Model Rule does not
address proceeding to trial separately from bringing charges and proposing to prohibit a prosecutor
from proceeding to trial if he knows the charge "is not supported by evidence sufficient to establish a
prima facie showing of guilt").
68 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 499-500.
69 See Zacharias, supra note 36, at 211.
70 Id. at 185-86.
71 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 486-87.
72 Medwed, supra note 4, at 37; Zacharias, supra note 36, at 186-87 ("[A] prosecutor's
consent to a motion for a new trial may have [a] persuasive effect on a judge making these
determinations.").
73 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 507-08.
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standard for ordering a new trial. And those standards vary widely-from
allowing a new trial if new evidence makes a different outcome probable, to
allowing a new trial only if no reasonable juror, considering both the evidence at
trial and the new evidence, would find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
7 4
Standards for Granting a New Trial
More Demanding
Clear and convincing evidence of innocence
and/or no reasonable o could --n--guilt
Almost cert ain o r substantial probabIlIty result wil be different
More likely than not result will be different
-------...----------------.----.... .. - ... .....  ........ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.... Reasonable proba bi!t.iy of acqu i.ta. . ...........................
Less Demanding
A second important consideration is the availability of an adversarial process
to test the defendant's claim to a new trial. The scope of the prosecutor's ethical
obligations before trial is based in part upon the prosecutor not being the final
arbiter of truth.75 So long as the process is fair, and each side zealously advocates
its position, one expects the trial to achieve the correct result. Similarly, insofar as
the parties can test the factual basis of the defendant's post-conviction claim of
innocence in an adversarial process, the prosecutor properly maintains his
adversarial role. Green and Yaroshefsky have suggested this is problematic
because the courts tend to defer to the prosecutor's assessment of the evidence
following conviction, 76 but the solution to that problem-to the extent it occurs-is
74 David R. Dow et al., Is It Constitutional to Execute Someone Who is Innocent (and If It
Isn 't, How Can It Be Stopped Following House v. Bell)?, 42 TULSA L. REv. 277, 293-321 (2006);
Garrett, supra note 13, at 1671. Presumably no trial would ensue after a court has determined no
reasonable juror would convict.
75 See Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 501-02 ("Prior to trial, a prosecutor may
rationalize that she is primarily a trial lawyer in an adversary process ...and that primary
responsibility for ascertaining guilt or innocence rests elsewhere.").
76 Id. at 502 ("A prosecutor who is personally convinced of the defendant's innocence might
nevertheless oppose a new trial motion in order to provide for adversary testing of the evidence and
to shift decision making to the court, but the court will not perceive that as the basis for the
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not to place a greater obligation upon the prosecutor to act neutrally, but to
construct a more robust adversarial process following conviction.
In some cases, however, no adversarial process is actually available because
of a statute of limitations. 7  Where an adversarial process is not available for
whatever reason, the prosecutor will have to determine whether he is sufficiently
convinced of the defendant's innocence that he is ethically obligated to assist the
defendant in seeking clemency. It is reasonable to suppose a prosecutor's decision
to support a petition for clemency will send a powerful signal to the primary
decision-maker-usually a parole board or the governor of the state.78
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS
As we previously mentioned, the prosecutor's evaluation of the defendant's
claim of innocence, and his decision to act upon that evaluation, can make a
substantial difference to the defendant's chance of obtaining relief. The difficulty
of requiring an adversarial actor to play this kind of non-adversarial role after
conviction has prompted one American state and a few other countries to turn to
alternative models.79
Most American states have hewed to the basic adversarial model to decide
post-conviction claims but, in response to DNA-based exonerations, have
engrafted onto it more robust post-conviction procedures.80 Although not linked to
DNA-based exonerations, the 1995 amendment of Israeli law to allow a convicted
defendant to apply to the Supreme Court for a new trial based upon new evidence
that generates "real suspicion" there has been a miscarriage of justice represents a
similar judgment regarding the need for a post-conviction adversarial process to
decide factual claims of innocence.
81
prosecutor's opposition and predictably will defer to the prosecutor's seeming judgment that the
defendant is guilty.").
77 In the states that have them, statutes of limitations range from twenty-one days to three
years. Garrett, supra note 13, at 1671. This is, however, changing-particularly for DNA evidence.
Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered
Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 Aiz. L. REv. 655, 677-78 (2005).
78 Green and Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 502.
79 See generally Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 36, at 490-93 (describing developments in
North Carolina, the United Kingdom, and Canada).
so See Garrett, supra note 13, at 1673 (noting the dramatic increase in DNA-testing related
state statutes over the past decade-from two in 1999 to forty-five in 2008); see also Medwed, supra
note 77, at 677-78 (noting some states have "carved out exceptions to general statutory time limits
when new trial motions involve newly discovered evidence" and a few treat claims based upon
scientific evidence with greater leniency).
81 Arye Rattner, The Sanctity of Criminal Law: Thoughts and Reflections on Wrongful
Conviction in Israel, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE 263, 266 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008); ISRAEL'S COURTS OF LAW AND
TRIBUNALS 18 (Aryeh Greenfield trans., A. G. Publications 3d ed. 2005).
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Australia has thus far retained a more prosecutor-centered model whereby the
Attorney-General of a state can refer a case to the court of appeals upon a
82defendant's petition for mercy. New South Wales alone has established an
independent panel to review applications for post-conviction DNA testing; that
panel also has the authority to refer a case to the court of appeals if the panel has a
"reasonable doubt" of the defendant's guilt.83 Only the United Kingdom, Canada,
and North Carolina have substantially departed from the adversarial model.
After a number of high-profile exonerations in North Carolina, that state
created the Actual Innocence Commission to study the problem of wrongful
conviction. 4  The Commission concluded that "neither the appellate nor
adversarial process is conducive to postconviction review of claims of
innocence. 85  North Carolina therefore established an independent review
commission, modeled upon the Criminal Cases Review Commission in the United
Kingdom, to screen claims of actual innocence. 6 The eight members of its
Innocence Inquiry Commission are appointed by the judiciary but operate
independently. 87  Even North Carolina has not completely abandoned the
adversarial model, however: The Commission has no authority to vacate a
conviction. Instead, if it finds "there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to
merit judicial review," then it refers the case to a special three-judge panel. 8
Before that panel, the parties resume their adversarial roles. 9
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) of the United Kingdom,
upon which North Carolina modeled its system, was established in the 1990s after
a number of high-profile wrongful convictions in IRA bombing cases came to
82 AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 9, ch. 45.37.
83 Weathered, supra note 10, at 189.
84 In December 2009, a group of attorneys with the unanimous support of the Florida Bar
Board of Governors petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida to create a "Florida Actual Innocence
Commission" modeled on the North Carolina Commission. Petition for a Rule Establishing an
Actual Innocence Commission at 1, 4 (Fla. 2009), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/documents/petitions/Filed_12-11 -
2009_InnocenceCommissionPetition.pdf. The Court has not yet acted upon the proposal. See Jan
Pudlow, Board Supports Creation of an 'Actual Innocence Commission', THE FLA. BAR
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.floridabar.org(DIVCOMIJN/jnnews01 .nsf/8c9fl3Ol2b96736985256aa900624829/e0e732
44c92ac182852576c 1004b88ab!OpenDocument.
85 Christine C. Mumma, The North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon
Perspectives Joined by a Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647, 654 (2004).
86 The Commission has referred two cases to the panel; one was rejected, but the other, which
did not involve DNA evidence, resulted in exoneration. See Robbie Brown, Judges Free Inmate on
Recommendation of Special Innocence Panel, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.corn2010/02/18/us/18innocent.html.
87 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1462 to -1463 (2009).
88 Id. § 15A-1469(a).
89 Id. § 15A-1469.
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light.90 Before the CCRC was established, a prisoner had to petition the Home
Secretary to refer his case to the Court of Appeal, but the Home Secretary rarely
responded favorably to such petitions.9' Unlike the North Carolina Commission,
the U.K. Commission considers claims of procedural error as well as factual
innocence, but, absent "exceptional circumstances," the evidence or argument
upon which a prisoner bases his petition must be new. 92 The CCRC may refer a
case to the Court of Appeal if there is a "real possibility that the conviction,
verdict, finding or sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made."
93
CCRC: Ind
U.K: Path of a Post-Conviction Case
dependent Agency Court of Appeals - A,
en RCRf
/ iat
dversarial
NO
NO
The CCRC has reviewed 11,100 convictions and referred 426 cases (3.8%) to
the Court of Appeal, which vacated the conviction in more than 70% of those
90 Stephanie Roberts & Lynne Weathered, Assisting the Factually Innocent: The
Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission,
29 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 48 (2009).
91 Kate Malleson, Appeals Against Conviction and the Principle of Finality, 21 J.L.S. 151,
153 (1994) (noting that the Home Office referred only four or five cases a year out of the 700-800
petitions submitted).
92 Roberts & Weathered, supra note 90, at 49.
93 Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 13(l)(a) (U.K.). Upon referral, the Court of Appeal
must quash a conviction if it is "unsafe." For a discussion of the two types of "unsafe" convictions,
see Stephanie Roberts, 'Unsafe' Convictions: Defining and Compensating Miscarriages of Justice,
66 MOD. L. REV. 441,445-50 (2003).
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referred (or 2.7% of the total).94 The experience in the U.K. does not suggest,
however, that having an independent body review convictions moots the
defendant's need for vigorous post-conviction advocacy; indeed, law schools in the
U.K. have recently begun to establish innocence projects modeled upon those in
the United States specifically to do the investigative work necessary to convince
the CCRC to undertake a searching review of a petition for possible reference to
the Court of Appeal. 95
Canada has adopted a similar system, with a lesser but still significant degree
of independence from the prosecuting office. A special task group made up of
attorneys in the federal Department of Justice reviews and investigates petitions
claiming actual innocence filed by persons convicted in the provincial courts;
9 6
when a federal prosecution is involved, the Minister of Justice must appoint an
outside investigator.97 If the group or investigator allows the petition, then the
Minister of Justice can order a new trial without further action from the courts.98
In response to charges that the task group was insufficiently independent of the
Government, the process was revised in 2002 so that it is governed by more
specific guidelines and is overseen by a Special Advisor to the Minister of Justice,
who is appointed from outside the Department.99 The task group also moved out
of the Department's offices to a private office building.l00
9 CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM'N, CASE STATISTICS, available at
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/cases/case_44.htm (last visited July 2, 2009).
95 Michael Naughton, Students for Justice: The Innocence Network, GUARDIAN, May 8, 2009,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/may/08/innocence-network; Roberts & Weathered,
supra note 90, at 64-69.
96 Kerry Scullion, Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Conviction Review Process
Pursuant to Section 696.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada, 46 CAN. J. CRIUNOLOGY & CRIM. JUST.
189, 191 (2004).
97 CAN. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2008 MINISTER OF JUSTICE: APPLICATIONS FOR
MINISTERIAL REVIEW, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2008), available at http://www.justice.ge.ca/eng/pi/ccr-
rc/rep08-rap08/toc-tdm.htrml.
98 Scullion, supra note 96, at 190-91.
99 Id. at 195.
100 CAN. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 97.
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Canada: Path of a Post-Conviction Case
CCRG -Within Ministry of Justice Canadian Courts -
NO Adversarial
w o e
YS YS
Although post-conviction relief in the U.K., Canada, and North Carolina is
still determined ultimately through an adversarial process, introducing a neutral
investigator to initiate that process appears to have been helpful in identifying
possibly meritorious claims. According to one report, for example, the CCRC has
referred three times as many cases to the Court of Appeal than had the Home
Secretary.101 Even in jurisdictions that do not depart from the adversarial model,
however, we think a more robust adversarial system to decide factual questions
after conviction would be an improvement over leaving with the prosecutor most
of the responsibility for evaluating a defendant's post-conviction claim of
innocence.
V. CONCLUSION
To sum up, the wave of DNA-based exonerations has raised awareness that
the possibility of a wrongful conviction is real, and as a result has cast serious
doubt upon the reliability of the adversarial process and in particular its
commitment to err upon the side of acquitting the guilty rather than risk convicting
an innocent. Developing an effective corrective mechanism is critical. Although a
prosecutor certainly has an ethical obligation to seek justice after conviction, he
should not be cast in the role of a neutral minister of justice; it is simply unrealistic
10' Weathered, supra note 10, at 182.
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to expect the prosecutor to play that role well. It is likely even more difficult for a
prosecutor to play that role well when responding to a post-conviction claim of
innocence that relies upon evidence less probative than DNA.
The newly-available procedures created by many states for litigating post-
conviction claims of innocence-for example, DNA testing statutes and waivers of
statutes of limitations for claims based upon new scientific evidence-provide one
solution, by replicating the adversarial process that prevails before conviction and
re-introducing a neutral decision-maker into the process. A superior alternative,
we submit, is to establish a post-conviction innocence commission that departs
much more substantially from the adversarial model. Rather than leaving claims
of actual innocence to the prosecutor's sense of justice, these procedures avoid the
conflict of interest inherent when the prosecutor is cast in conflicting roles.

